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Abstract In this paper we analyse whether relative deprivation has divergent
effects on different types of social and political action. We expect that it will
depress volunteering with parties as well as different types of conventional political
participation more generally while stimulating volunteering with anti-cuts organi-
sations and engagement in various kinds of protest activism. There is little research
into how relative deprivation impacts on different types of social and political action
from the wide range of activities available to citizens in contemporary democracies
as well as into how this relationship might vary based on the wider economic
context. While many studies construct scales, we examine participation in specific
activities and associations, such as parties or anti-cuts organisations, voting, con-
tacting, demonstrating and striking to show that deprivation has divergent effects
that depart from what is traditionally argued. We apply random effects models with
cross-level interactions utilizing an original cross-national European dataset col-
lected in 2015 (N = 17,667) within a collaborative funded-project. We show that a
negative economic context has a mobilizing effect by both increasing the stimu-
lating effect of relative deprivation on protest activism as well as by closing or
reversing the gap between resource-poor and resource-rich groups for volunteering
with parties and voting.
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Introduction
In this paper, we analyse whether relative deprivation has divergent effects on
different types of social and political action. We expect that it will depress
volunteering with parties as well as different types of conventional political
participation more generally while stimulating volunteering with anti-cuts organ-
isations and engagement in various kinds of protest activism. There is little research
into how relative deprivation impacts on different types of social and political action
from the wide range of activities available to citizens in contemporary democracies
as well as into how this relationship might vary based on the wider economic
context (see for e.g. Grasso and Giugni 2016; Kern et al. 2015). Negative economic
contexts could be understood to stimulate political action, and particularly protest
(Giugni and Grasso 2015a, 2016; Grasso and Giugni 2016). Indeed, grievance-based
accounts of participation have traditionally linked relative deprivation with anti-
systemic action (Buechler 2004). Moreover, negative economic conditions could be
seen to deepen existent inequalities in political voice (Evans and Tilley 2017).
In order to investigate these important questions for democratic societies, we
apply random effects models with cross-level interactions utilising an original cross-
national European dataset collected in 2015 (N = 17,667) within a collaborative
funded-project. We contribute to the literature by showing that a negative economic
context has a mobilising effect by both increasing the stimulating effect of relative
deprivation on protest activism as well as by closing or reversing the gap between
resource-poor and resource-rich groups for volunteering with parties and voting.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: First, we look at previous literature
on relative deprivation and political participation and draw out our hypotheses. Next
we detail our data and methods. After that, we develop our random effects models,
testing how relative deprivation impacts on participation in different repertoires as
well as the extent to which this is mediated by economic context. The models also
allow to test whether inequalities in participation deepen in times of crisis for a wide
range of political actions. We conclude the paper by drawing out the implications of
our results for the wider literature and future research on this topic.
Previous research
As Van Deth (2014) notes, citizens’ participation is ‘the elixir of life’ of democracy.
Since civic engagement and political participation provide the bedrock for the very
functioning of democracy, they have been a long-standing concern of political
scientists. As Hay (2007) points out, the conclusions on the health of democracy
tend to be drawn on the basis of definitions of participation with scholars holding
more fluid understandings of participation normally arguing that the nature of
participation is simply changing but not necessarily deteriorating.
Voting and participation in traditional representative agencies such as political
parties and trade unions has been the focus of a first group of studies on political
participation more specifically (Verba et al. 1978; Berger 1982). This type of
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participation allows for feeding the political interests of citizens back into the
processes of policy-making. Since Edmund Burke, elected representatives have
been understood to translate the interests of their constituents in their deliberations
and voting strategies in Parliament.
Later, in the 1960s and 70s, new forms of participation such as demonstrations,
occupations, picket-lines and wild-cat strikes started becoming increasingly popular
and linked to the emergence of ‘new’ social movements such as the environmental
movement (Giugni and Grasso 2015b). A second group of scholars came to focus on
these ‘unconventional’ or ‘extra-institutional’ modes of action (Barnes and Kaase
1979; Inglehart 1977). These types of participation did not rely on political
representatives whether in Parliament, political parties or trade unions, but relied on
individuals’ own, immediate participation in political acts of defiance. Traditionally,
unconventional types of political action were the preserve of the working classes
and other marginalised groups that did not have the vote (Lipsky 1968). For
example, the youth revolts of ’68 occurred at a time where the voting age was still
21. More generally, it is theorised that these extra-institutional types of participation
are practiced in scenarios where the more conventional modes of participation have
been shown to be insufficient or seem ineffective and inadequate for obtaining given
political objectives.
Most recently, drawing on Tocqueville, other scholars have focused on social
participation within organisations in civil society and linking such types of
participation to the idea of political culture within the wider community (Almond
and Verba 1963; Eckstein 1961). In particular, the literature on social capital
(Bourdieu 1983; Coleman 1990; Putnam 1993, 1995, 2000) focuses on this latter
aspect more specifically and looks at the frequency of social contact and community
involvement, including for political ends, in the forms of social participation e.g.
joining or volunteering within associations. At the heart of most understandings of
social participation is membership in voluntary associations and volunteering within
them (Curtis et al. 2001). To count as social participation, they must involve face-to-
face interaction from which reciprocity and trust then flow; they should engage
members in collective endeavours for a common cause so that capacities for
collective action are nurtured (Hall 1999). The underlying thinking in this school of
thought is above all that civic engagement is important for democracy.
Given participation’s centrality for democratic practice, it should not come as a
surprise that falling and unequal levels of political engagement are major concerns
for political scientists (Hall 1999). The literature has documented the decline of
civic engagement and political participation in the United States (Putnam
1995, 2000; Pharr and Putnam 2000; Skocpol 2003). In Western Europe, more
recent generations appear to be less participatory than older ones in both
conventional and unconventional participation (Grasso 2014, 2016). The evidence
is more mixed for social participation (Hall 1999). Given the importance of
participation for democracy, it is crucial, particularly in the current context of
economic crisis, to investigate how relative deprivation impacts on participation.
The recent economic crisis led to growing unemployment and shrinking economic
growth across Europe and the rest of the world (De Grauwe and Ji 2013). Almost
10 years on, in some countries, such as Greece and Spain, unemployment is still at
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very high levels. These developments are likely to exacerbate the impact of relative
deprivation on different types of political actions. As such, this study aims to
investigate the impact of relative deprivation for different types of participation.
This study also aims to analyse whether a negative economic context exacerbates
the effect of relative deprivation for stimulating or inhibiting different types of
participation as well as whether it widens existent inequalities in political action.
Considering the implications of economic adversity on repertoires of participa-
tion suggests that the effect may well vary between domains and that there will be
differences in the effects of subjective feelings of relative deprivation, economic
context, and resources. In our analysis of the effect of crisis on participation and
inequalities, we examine relative deprivation, popularised within the context of
grievance theories of collective action (Gurr 1970). Feelings of relative deprivation
arise when one compares one’s current living standards with some other situation—
either one’s in the past, or one’s expectation of where one should have been at
present, or a picture of justice and injustice, etc. The idea that satisfaction and
deprivation are relative to the available comparisons that one has were originally
developed by Merton (1957) and particularly Stouffer et al. (1949) in their work on
the American Soldier. This idea helped them to make sense of the puzzle from their
results that the military police were more satisfied with slow promotions than Air
Corpsmen were with their rapid promotions. Relative deprivation became an
important concept in social science because it clearly showed that social judgement
is based not only in absolute standards but also in relative comparisons (Smith and
Pettigrew 2015; Pettigrew 2016; Walker and Pettigrew 1984; Smith et al. 2012).
As Pettigrew (2016) notes, relative deprivation is an important concept because it
challenges conventional wisdom about the importance of absolute deprivation.
Davis (1959) further developed a mathematical model of relative deprivation.
Runciman (1966) distinguished between relative deprivation based on personal
comparisons (egoistic deprivation) and relative deprivation based on group
comparisons (fraternalistic deprivation). In particular, Pettigrew (2016) has
criticised Gurr’s (1970) Why Men Rebel study on the basis that it falls into the
ecological fallacy since relative deprivation is a phenomenon of individuals not
societies and therefore micro-level phenomena cannot be assumed from macro-level
findings. Pettigrew (2016) further emphasises how the central thrust of relative
deprivation is that individual responses are often different from those that are
expected of the macro category. For example, while macro-level high unemploy-
ment might spur protest participation, unemployed individuals may be less likely to
engage in protest activism. Foster and Matheson (1995) further showed that when
group experience becomes relevant for one’s personal experience protest increases
so individuals who are deprived and also belong to particularly resource-poor
groups should be particularly likely to protest. Suddenly imposed grievances refer to
an unexpected threat or inroad upon people’s rights or circumstances such as for
example deteriorating economic conditions during crisis (Walsh 1981).
While grievance theories suggest that relative deprivation should spur protest
activism, the classic Marienthal study showed how widespread unemployment
depressed the once-vibrant civic life of an industrial village in Austria (Jahoda et al.
1933). Widespread unemployment affected the whole community so that the
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citizens of Marienthal became less likely to attend voluntary organisations, clubs
and public buildings such as the free library; the study showed that their social
relations also deteriorated. This type of study suggests that deprivation should
depress conventional participation in particular. Moreover, these results suggest that
further austerity budget cuts, removing community safety nets and funding for
social service initiatives, are likely to create less, not more, self-reliant citizens,
particularly in the current economic context.
Putnam (2000), too, in his famous study also showed that civic associations in the
United States declined sharply during the Great Depression. However, we now live
in different times and the current economic crisis was not as deep. We might also
wonder whether citizens in European societies in the late 00s with higher standards
of living and where citizens are by and large insulated—even amongst the most
resource-poor groups—by the most pernicious economic consequences through
various social safety nets would suffer as much as US citizens in the late 1920s (Lim
and Laurence 2015). A more recent study with data from the America’s Barometer
showed that there was a significant decline in social trust between 2006 and 2010
and that negative evaluations of personal and national economic situations were
associated with a lower level of trust (Zizumbo-Colunga et al. 2010). Lim and
Laurence (2015) found that volunteering declined in the current crisis in the UK and
US. Hall (1999) had also suggested that the decline in trust in the UK in the early
1980s was probably linked to economic insecurity, experiences of unemployment
and pessimism for the economy emerging from the 1980 to 1982 crisis. However, it
could also be held that participation in social movement organisations (SMO) linked
to protest activism and against austerity cuts might rise, by the same logic that we
expect unconventional participation to be spurred as a result of deprivation and the
development of grievances in times of crisis.
It is notable in particular that the current economic crisis has brought with it high
levels of unemployment particularly in Southern European countries. Moreover, the
literature shows that unemployed people will be less likely to become involved in
volunteering activities since they are morally discouraged and decrease their social
activities more generally (Feather 1989; Strauss 2008). However, some unemployed
people can be more resource rich and prefer unemployment to what they perceive as
inadequate job opportunities (Dunn et al. 2014). The literature has also shown that
while unemployed people might be more ‘biographically available’ (McAdam
1986), their lower density networks mean that they are less likely to be asked to
volunteer and thus mobilised to participation than those who are employed
(Schussman and Soule 2005; Saunders et al. 2012). As such, the question remains
open as to whether unemployed people suffer from lower volunteering and social
participation to those in employment and to what extent. During economic crises,
people might feel more financially insecure and thus spend more hours on the job to
ensure that they do not become unemployed (Lim and Laurence 2015). This would
be particularly true of those in manual occupations, as such we would expect to see
inequalities in social activism by social class. Moreover, research has traditionally
shown an important effect of resources on participation (Brady et al. 1995; Verba
et al. 1995). As such, we would expect to see class-based inequalities in
participation (Grasso 2018). Other than by employment status and occupational
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class, we expect to see inequalities by education. Education has historically been
shown to be a particularly important resource for all types of participation (Grasso
2013).
While seemingly straightforward, grievance theories were challenged in the
1970s by scholars arguing that while grievances were ubiquitous, most people did
not participate, as such other factors must clearly be more important in terms of
explaining why some people participate, whereas others do not. Resources
(McCarthy and Zald 1977), such as political interest, and other skills, such as
those emphasised in the civic voluntarism model (Verba et al. 1995), as well as
wider political opportunities (McAdam 1982) were suggested as possible answers.
Another prominent factor emphasised was efficacy, or the expectation that group-
level problems could be effectively solved through participation in collective action.
In a similar vein to the idea of agency capable of affecting structure, efficacy is
understood as the individual’s expectation that it is possible to alter conditions or
policies through protest (Gamson 1992). Political efficacy is further subdivided into
two dimensions—internal efficacy—the extent to which someone believes to
understand politics and therefore participates in politics; and external efficacy—
citizens’ faith and trust in government (Van Stekelenburg and Klandermans 2013).
Other than efficacy and political interest mentioned earlier, the political engagement
model emphasised also the importance of leftist and libertarian social and political
values for protest participation in particular (Schussman and Soule 2005). Sharing
political values allows for the interpretation of the messages that social movements
disseminate through information, a process known as framing (Benford and Snow
2000; Snow 2004).
Moreover, social embeddedness has traditionally been understood as fundamen-
tal for stimulating participation. Klandermans et al. (2008) for example showed how
immigrants who felt efficacious were more likely to protest if they were also
embedded in social networks, especially ethnic networks, offering the opportunity
to discuss and learn about politics. Networks provide space to develop narratives of
dissent in criticising the opposition (Paxton 2002). Moreover, being integrated in a
network increases the chances that one will be targeted for mobilisation
(Klandermans and Oegema 1987). Memberships provide links and networks made
of acquaintances that are already active within social movements are more likely to
draw one into political action (Klandermans 1997). Moreover, networks are
communication channels for the diffusion of information, and they also allow the
development of shared collective narratives (Gamson 1992). Additionally, the
literature has shown that age impacts on participation—depressing conventional
action and spurring protest participation and that women are generally more
politically marginalised (Verba et al. 1997). When testing our hypotheses below, we
will be controlling also for the other relevant factors for participation discussed.
To further summarise the discussion above in terms of the expected effects, we
draw out the following hypotheses to guide our analysis:
H1 Feelings of relative deprivation decrease the chances that someone will engage
in conventional participation (volunteering with political parties, voting, contacting
politicians).
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H2 Feelings of relative deprivation increase the chances that someone will engage
in unconventional participation (volunteering with anti-cuts organisations, demon-
strating, and striking).
H3 Resource-poor groups (manual workers, unemployed, low education) are less
likely to engage in conventional political participation.
H4 Resource-poor groups (manual workers, unemployed, low education) are more
likely to engage in unconventional political participation.
H5 A negative economic context depresses conventional participation.
H6 A negative economic context stimulates unconventional participation.
H7 A negative economic context increases the negative effect of feelings of
relative deprivation for inhibiting conventional participation.
H8 A negative economic context increases the positive effect of feelings of
relative deprivation for stimulating unconventional participation.
H9 A negative economic context increases the negative effect of belonging to a
resource-poor group for inhibiting conventional participation.
H10 A negative economic context increases the positive effect of belonging to a
resource-poor group for stimulating unconventional participation.
Data and methods
In order to test our hypotheses, we rely on data from an original cross-national
survey (N = 18,370) conducted in 2015 in the context of the Living with Hard
Times (LIVEWHAT) [grant agreement number 613237] project funded by the
European Commission under the auspices of their 7th Framework Programme. The
survey was conducted in each of the nine European countries included in the
project: France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Poland, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and
the UK by a specialised polling agency (YouGov) using online panels with the
methodologies available in each country and quota balanced in order to match
national population statistics in terms of region, sex, age and education level. The
total final sample consisted of 17,667 individuals once missing cases were deleted.
This allows us to compare across models with different dependent variables as the
sample is the same.
For our dependent variables measures, we followed the classic literature (Verba
et al. 1995; Pattie et al. 2004) as well as the outline and examples presented in Van
Deth (2014) and constructed them as follows. For conventional participation, we
included dummy variables for volunteering with political parties, voting at the last
national election and contacting a politician. For unconventional participation, we
included dummies for volunteering with an anti-cuts organisation, demonstrating
and striking. In this way, our analysis allows us to disentangle whether the effect of
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relative deprivation is different for social and political participation in conventional
and unconventional repertoires and also types of organisations.
The independent variables are operationalised as follows: The key independent
variable for relative deprivation is measured with a question asking respondents
whether they felt that their household economic conditions had deteriorated in the
last 5 years, to allow for the time-ordering necessary for causality. We dichotomise
this measure following previous research (Ru¨dig and Karyotis 2013) in a dummy for
whether individuals felt the economic situation of their household had become
worse. Moreover, to look at inequalities, we created dummy variables for those with
lower education levels (less than secondary school); those in manual occupations;
and those that were currently unemployed. Following the literature discussed on the
various determinants of political participation, we also control for a number of other
key variables operationalised as follows: age (a continuous variable), gender (a
dummy variable for male gender), political interest (a dummy variable for interest),
internal and external political efficacy (both scales, the sign for external efficacy is
reversed as the statements were all negative), left–right and libertarian–authoritarian
values (both scales of five items) and organisational membership (number of
organisations of which one is a member 0–12).
We also include a macro-level independent variable. To account for economic
context, we include a measure for unemployment levels at the aggregate level as the
key measure of negative economic performance in times of crisis due to its visibility
and the negative implications for citizens. This allows us to test for H5–H6 as well
as, with cross-level interactions, for H7–H10. All variable descriptive statistics are
presented in Table 1. Table 2 presents variable distributions by country.
Our modelling strategy is described as follows. Our dependent variables are
measured at the individual level. However, our respondents are nested in their
respective countries. Thus, we specify multi-level models with random intercept
coefficients to take into account the two-level nature of the data (country and
individual). This type of model is useful to correct for the within-country
dependence of observations (intraclass correlation) and adjusts both within and
between parameter estimates in relation to the clustered nature of the data. Since we
use dependent variables that are dichotomous, we estimate logistic multi-level
models with a Gaussian link function.
Results
Table 3 presents the results from multi-level models that allow us to examine the
evidence for and against the hypotheses presented in our theoretical section. First
however, we turn to quickly examining the effects of the controls. In Table 3,
Models 1–6, we can see that confirming previous results in the literature on
participation, older people tend to be more likely to become involved in
conventional activities (voting and contacting), whereas young people are more
likely to become involved in unconventional activities (demonstrating and striking,
and volunteering with anti-cuts organisations). Men are more likely than women to
engage in both conventional activities and both kinds of volunteering (with political
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parties and anti-cuts organisations) but there are no gender differences for
unconventional participation. In terms of the other classical controls, we can see
that they largely behave as expected: greater political interest is generally linked
with greater activism (except for engagement with anti-cuts organisations); both
internal and external political efficacy tend to foster activism (external efficacy does
not have an effect on striking and volunteering with anti-cuts organisations); more
leftist and more libertarian individuals tend to be more engaged (though there do not
seem to be left–right ideological differences for party volunteering or social value
differences for conventional activism including party volunteering); having wider
social networks also tends to foster involvement, with the exception of turnout.
Moving on to testing our hypotheses, Table 3, Models 1–6, include our key
measure of relative deprivation, since we argued that in order for it to have an
impact on participation, deprivation needs to be subjectively understood and
experienced and that in particular a perceived change in circumstances as a result of
the crisis should create grievances that spur individuals to unconventional
participation.
H1 and H2 suggested that feelings of relative deprivation should depress
conventional participation but spur unconventional participation. The results from
Models 1–6 in Table 3 show that H1 is not supported: relative deprivation has no
effect on voting or volunteering for a party and rather stimulates contacting a
politician. On the other hand, there is clear support for H2: relative deprivation has a
Table 1 Variable descriptive statistics
Mean SD Min Max
Voted at last national election 0.79408 0.40438 0 1
Contacted a politician 0.13353 0.34015 0 1
Protest participation 0.11105 0.31421 0 1
Strike participation 0.05587 0.22967 0 1
Volunteered for a political party 0.04760 0.21293 0 1
Volunteered for anti-cuts organisation 0.01868 0.13539 0 1
Relative deprivation 0.45407 0.4979 0 1
Age 44.8188 14.812 18 88
Gender (male) 0.47207 0.49923 0 1
Education level (less than upper secondary) 0.24062 0.42747 0 1
Occupation (manual) 0.23773 0.42571 0 1
Unemployed 0.11722 0.32170 0 1
Political interest 0.64312 0.47909 0 1
Internal political efficacy 0.49393 0.39755 0 1
External political efficacy 0.47929 0.35868 0 1
Left–right values 5.23925 1.84270 0 10
Libertarian–authoritarian values 4.46535 1.87859 0 10
Organisational memberships 1.25324 2.38321 0 12
Unemployment rate 2014 11.9268 7.75242 4.5 26.5
N 17,667
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stimulating effect on all three unconventional activities: demonstrating, striking and
volunteering with an anti-cuts organisation. The effect is particularly strong for the
latter two activities; demonstrating is also stimulated, and more so than contacting a
politician—the one conventional activity that also showed a positive relationship
with relative deprivation.
Moving on to the evidence in Models 1–6 from Table 3 for H3 and H4—which
suggested that resource-poor groups (those with lower education, manual workers
and the unemployed) should be less likely to engage in conventional activities and
more likely to engage in unconventional activities—we find some evidence for H3:
individuals with lower education are less likely to vote and contact a politician (but
they are not less likely to volunteer for a party), individuals in manual occupations
are also less likely to vote and contact a politician (but they are not less likely to
volunteer for a party), unemployed individuals are less likely to vote (but they are
not less likely to contact a politician or volunteer for a party). As such, while H3 is
confirmed for voting across all three resource-poor groups, the idea that being in a
resource-poor group depresses other forms of conventional participation (contacting
a politician and volunteering for a party) is not as widely supported. Moving on to
H4—suggesting that resource-poor groups are more likely to become involved in
unconventional participation as ‘weapons of the weak’—we find that individuals
with lower education are not more likely to become involved in these actions (there
are no differences for demonstrating and volunteering for an anti-cuts organisation
whereas there is a negative effect of belonging to this group for striking). There are
also no differences by occupation so manual workers are not more likely to engage
in unconventional participation; unemployed people are in fact less likely to
demonstrate, strike (possibly due to their restricted networks given the lack of
employment and the lower chances to be asked to participate) and there is no
difference for volunteering in anti-cuts organisations. As such H4 is not supported
by the results of our modelling. Rather, where there is any difference by resources at
all, being resource-poor appears to depress participation—as was also found for
conventional activism. This finding shows that absolute types of deprivation such as
having lower resources depress all types of participation whereas subjective feelings
of relative deprivation can act to spur protest action. As such, this finding further
underscores the critical importance of distinguishing between relative and absolute
types of deprivation.
To examine the evidence in favour or against our next set of hypotheses, H5 and
H6 on the effect of the economic context, we turn to the results from Models 7–12 in
Table 3, for the same set of six indicators (thee conventional and three
unconventional). Models 7–12 also include a measure for economic context,
unemployment, perhaps the most visible symbol of the deterioration of the economy
following economic crisis and the one that is likely to show the greatest toll in terms
of loss of opportunities and the undermining of government credibility with respect
to their ability to run the economy. We can see here that whereas H5 is not supported
since a negative economic context does not depress conventional participation, there
is evidence for H6 with both demonstrating and striking are higher in more negative
economic contexts.
M. T. Grasso et al.
T
a
b
le
4
M
u
lt
i-
le
v
el
lo
g
is
ti
c
m
o
d
el
s
p
re
d
ic
ti
n
g
co
n
v
en
ti
o
n
al
,
u
n
co
n
v
en
ti
o
n
al
an
d
so
ci
al
p
ar
ti
ci
p
at
io
n
in
cl
u
d
in
g
m
ac
ro
-l
ev
el
u
n
em
p
lo
y
m
en
t
an
d
cr
o
ss
-l
ev
el
in
te
ra
ct
io
n
s
w
it
h
re
la
ti
v
e
d
ep
ri
v
at
io
n
an
d
lo
w
ed
u
ca
ti
o
n
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
V
o
ti
n
g
C
o
n
ta
ct
in
g
D
em
o
n
st
ra
ti
n
g
S
tr
ik
in
g
V
o
lu
n
te
er
in
g
p
ar
ty
V
o
lu
n
te
er
in
g
an
ti
-c
u
ts
R
el
at
iv
e
d
ep
.
-
0
.0
2
0
.1
4
-
0
.1
0
0
.0
6
-
0
.0
9
0
.1
8
(0
.0
8
)
(0
.0
9
)
(0
.1
1
)
(0
.1
7
)
(0
.1
7
)
(0
.3
1
)
A
g
e
0
.0
3
*
*
*
0
.0
1
*
*
*
-
0
.0
1
*
*
*
-
0
.0
2
*
*
*
-
0
.0
0
-
0
.0
1
*
(0
.0
0
)
(0
.0
0
)
(0
.0
0
)
(0
.0
0
)
(0
.0
0
)
(0
.0
1
)
G
en
d
er
(m
al
e)
0
.1
6
*
*
*
0
.2
5
*
*
*
-
0
.0
0
-
0
.0
0
0
.4
7
*
*
*
0
.2
9
*
(0
.0
4
)
(0
.0
5
)
(0
.0
5
)
(0
.0
7
)
(0
.0
8
)
(0
.1
4
)
E
d
u
ca
ti
o
n
(l
o
w
)
-
0
.2
4
*
*
*
-
0
.1
4
*
-
0
.0
7
-
0
.2
2
*
-
0
.0
0
0
.1
0
(0
.0
5
)
(0
.0
6
)
(0
.0
7
)
(0
.0
9
)
(0
.1
0
)
(0
.1
7
)
O
cc
u
p
at
io
n
(m
an
u
al
)
-
0
.1
2
*
-
0
.1
4
*
0
.0
6
0
.0
0
-
0
.1
3
-
0
.2
6
(0
.0
5
)
(0
.0
6
)
(0
.0
6
)
(0
.0
9
)
(0
.1
0
)
(0
.1
7
)
U
n
em
p
lo
y
ed
-
0
.2
6
*
*
*
-
0
.0
6
-
0
.2
5
*
*
-
0
.5
3
*
*
*
0
.0
1
0
.1
5
(0
.0
6
)
(0
.0
8
)
(0
.0
8
)
(0
.1
1
)
(0
.1
4
)
(0
.1
9
)
P
o
li
ti
ca
l
in
te
re
st
0
.7
5
*
*
*
0
.8
4
*
*
*
0
.7
6
*
*
*
0
.3
9
*
*
*
0
.6
7
*
*
*
-
0
.0
2
(0
.0
5
)
(0
.0
7
)
(0
.0
7
)
(0
.0
9
)
(0
.1
3
)
(0
.1
8
)
In
te
rn
al
p
o
li
ti
ca
l
ef
fi
ca
cy
0
.6
3
*
*
*
1
.0
0
*
*
*
0
.7
8
*
*
*
0
.4
0
*
*
*
1
.4
5
*
*
*
0
.5
7
*
*
(0
.0
6
)
(0
.0
7
)
(0
.0
8
)
(0
.1
0
)
(0
.1
3
)
(0
.2
0
)
E
x
te
rn
al
p
o
li
ti
ca
l
ef
fi
ca
cy
-
0
.1
5
*
*
-
0
.1
8
*
-
0
.1
8
*
0
.0
1
-
0
.7
1
*
*
*
0
.1
1
(0
.0
6
)
(0
.0
7
)
(0
.0
8
)
(0
.1
1
)
(0
.1
2
)
(0
.2
1
)
L
ef
t–
ri
g
h
t
v
al
u
es
(0
–
1
0
)
0
.0
5
*
*
*
-
0
.0
3
*
-
0
.1
8
*
*
*
-
0
.1
6
*
*
*
0
.0
3
-
0
.1
9
*
*
*
(0
.0
1
)
(0
.0
1
)
(0
.0
2
)
(0
.0
2
)
(0
.0
2
)
(0
.0
5
)
L
ib
er
ta
ri
an
–
au
th
o
ri
ta
ri
an
v
al
u
es
(0
–
1
0
)
-
0
.0
1
-
0
.0
1
-
0
.1
8
*
*
*
-
0
.0
7
*
*
*
0
.0
2
-
0
.0
7
(0
.0
1
)
(0
.0
1
)
(0
.0
2
)
(0
.0
2
)
(0
.0
2
)
(0
.0
5
)
Relative deprivation and inequalities in social and…
T
a
b
le
4
co
n
ti
n
u
ed
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
V
o
ti
n
g
C
o
n
ta
ct
in
g
D
em
o
n
st
ra
ti
n
g
S
tr
ik
in
g
V
o
lu
n
te
er
in
g
p
ar
ty
V
o
lu
n
te
er
in
g
an
ti
-c
u
ts
O
rg
an
is
at
io
n
al
m
em
b
er
sh
ip
s
(0
–
1
2
)
-
0
.0
1
0
.1
6
*
*
*
0
.1
7
*
*
*
0
.1
6
*
*
*
0
.4
0
*
*
*
0
.5
3
*
*
*
(0
.0
1
)
(0
.0
1
)
(0
.0
1
)
(0
.0
1
)
(0
.0
1
)
(0
.0
2
)
U
n
em
p
lo
y
m
en
t
2
0
1
4
0
.0
3
-
0
.0
0
0
.0
6
*
*
0
.0
8
*
*
0
.0
0
0
.0
3
(0
.0
3
)
(0
.0
1
)
(0
.0
2
)
(0
.0
3
)
(0
.0
2
)
(0
.0
3
)
R
el
at
iv
e
d
ep
ri
v
at
io
n
9
u
n
em
p
lo
y
m
en
t
2
0
1
4
0
.0
0
-
0
.0
0
0
.0
2
*
0
.0
1
0
.0
1
0
.0
1
(0
.0
1
)
(0
.0
1
)
(0
.0
1
)
(0
.0
1
)
(0
.0
1
)
(0
.0
2
)
L
o
w
ed
u
ca
ti
o
n
9
u
n
em
p
lo
y
m
en
t
2
0
1
4
C
o
n
st
an
t
-
1
.0
9
*
-
3
.5
2
*
*
*
-
2
.2
5
*
*
*
-
3
.1
3
*
*
*
-
5
.7
2
*
*
*
-
5
.7
6
*
*
*
(0
.5
0
)
(0
.2
4
)
(0
.2
8
)
(0
.4
8
)
(0
.4
1
)
(0
.5
4
)
N
1
7
,6
6
7
1
7
,6
6
7
1
7
,6
6
7
1
7
,6
6
7
1
7
,6
6
7
1
7
,6
6
7
L
o
g
li
k
.
-
7
3
7
0
.8
9
-
6
1
5
0
.1
6
-
5
1
1
3
.2
7
-
3
1
8
2
.5
0
-
2
4
1
2
.0
7
-
8
5
6
.2
8
A
IC
1
4
,7
7
3
.7
8
1
2
,3
3
2
.3
1
1
0
,2
5
8
.5
5
6
3
9
7
.0
1
4
8
5
6
.1
4
1
7
4
4
.5
5
B
IC
1
4
,8
9
8
.2
5
1
2
,4
5
6
.7
8
1
0
,3
8
3
.0
2
6
5
2
1
.4
8
4
9
8
0
.6
1
1
8
6
9
.0
2
ru
0
.7
9
0
.3
2
0
.3
9
0
.7
0
0
.5
1
0
.5
2
q
0
.1
6
0
.0
3
0
.0
4
0
.1
3
0
.0
7
0
.0
8
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
(1
0
)
(1
1
)
(1
2
)
V
o
ti
n
g
C
o
n
ta
ct
in
g
D
em
o
n
st
ra
ti
n
g
S
tr
ik
in
g
V
o
lu
n
te
er
in
g
p
ar
ty
V
o
lu
n
te
er
in
g
an
ti
-c
u
ts
R
el
at
iv
e
d
ep
.
0
.0
1
0
.1
0
*
0
.1
6
*
*
0
.2
3
*
*
-
0
.0
1
0
.2
9
(0
.0
5
)
(0
.0
5
)
(0
.0
6
)
(0
.0
8
)
(0
.0
9
)
(0
.1
5
)
A
g
e
0
.0
3
*
*
*
0
.0
1
*
*
*
-
0
.0
1
*
*
*
-
0
.0
2
*
*
*
-
0
.0
0
-
0
.0
1
*
(0
.0
0
)
(0
.0
0
)
(0
.0
0
)
(0
.0
0
)
(0
.0
0
)
(0
.0
1
)
G
en
d
er
(m
al
e)
0
.1
6
*
*
*
0
.2
5
*
*
*
0
.0
0
0
.0
0
0
.4
6
*
*
*
0
.2
9
*
(0
.0
4
)
(0
.0
5
)
(0
.0
5
)
(0
.0
7
)
(0
.0
8
)
(0
.1
4
)
M. T. Grasso et al.
T
a
b
le
4
co
n
ti
n
u
ed
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
(1
0
)
(1
1
)
(1
2
)
V
o
ti
n
g
C
o
n
ta
ct
in
g
D
em
o
n
st
ra
ti
n
g
S
tr
ik
in
g
V
o
lu
n
te
er
in
g
p
ar
ty
V
o
lu
n
te
er
in
g
an
ti
-c
u
ts
E
d
u
ca
ti
o
n
(l
o
w
)
-
0
.4
5
*
*
*
-
0
.2
2
-
0
.0
3
0
.1
0
-
0
.4
7
*
0
.0
7
(0
.0
9
)
(0
.1
1
)
(0
.1
4
)
(0
.2
0
)
(0
.2
0
)
(0
.3
5
)
O
cc
u
p
at
io
n
(m
an
u
al
)
-
0
.1
2
*
-
0
.1
3
*
0
.0
6
-
0
.0
0
-
0
.1
3
-
0
.2
6
(0
.0
5
)
(0
.0
6
)
(0
.0
6
)
(0
.0
9
)
(0
.1
0
)
(0
.1
7
)
U
n
em
p
lo
y
ed
-
0
.2
7
*
*
*
-
0
.0
7
-
0
.2
5
*
*
-
0
.5
1
*
*
*
-
0
.0
2
0
.1
5
(0
.0
6
)
(0
.0
8
)
(0
.0
8
)
(0
.1
1
)
(0
.1
4
)
(0
.1
9
)
P
o
li
ti
ca
l
in
te
re
st
0
.7
6
*
*
*
0
.8
4
*
*
*
0
.7
6
*
*
*
0
.3
9
*
*
*
0
.6
8
*
*
*
-
0
.0
1
(0
.0
5
)
(0
.0
7
)
(0
.0
7
)
(0
.0
9
)
(0
.1
3
)
(0
.1
8
)
In
te
rn
al
p
o
li
ti
ca
l
ef
fi
ca
cy
0
.6
3
*
*
*
1
.0
1
*
*
*
0
.7
8
*
*
*
0
.4
0
*
*
*
1
.4
6
*
*
*
0
.5
7
*
*
(0
.0
6
)
(0
.0
7
)
(0
.0
8
)
(0
.1
0
)
(0
.1
3
)
(0
.2
0
)
E
x
te
rn
al
p
o
li
ti
ca
l
ef
fi
ca
cy
-
0
.1
5
*
-
0
.1
7
*
-
0
.1
8
*
0
.0
0
-
0
.7
1
*
*
*
0
.1
1
(0
.0
6
)
(0
.0
7
)
(0
.0
8
)
(0
.1
1
)
(0
.1
2
)
(0
.2
1
)
L
ef
t–
ri
g
h
t
v
al
u
es
(0
–
1
0
)
0
.0
5
*
*
*
-
0
.0
3
*
-
0
.1
8
*
*
*
-
0
.1
6
*
*
*
0
.0
3
-
0
.1
9
*
*
*
(0
.0
1
)
(0
.0
1
)
(0
.0
2
)
(0
.0
2
)
(0
.0
2
)
(0
.0
5
)
L
ib
er
ta
ri
an
–
au
th
o
ri
ta
ri
an
v
al
u
es
(0
–
1
0
)
-
0
.0
1
-
0
.0
1
-
0
.1
8
*
*
*
-
0
.0
8
*
*
*
0
.0
2
-
0
.0
7
(0
.0
1
)
(0
.0
1
)
(0
.0
2
)
(0
.0
2
)
(0
.0
2
)
(0
.0
5
)
O
rg
an
is
at
io
n
al
m
em
b
er
sh
ip
s
(0
–
1
2
)
-
0
.0
1
0
.1
6
*
*
*
0
.1
7
*
*
*
0
.1
6
*
*
*
0
.4
0
*
*
*
0
.5
3
*
*
*
(0
.0
1
)
(0
.0
1
)
(0
.0
1
)
(0
.0
1
)
(0
.0
1
)
(0
.0
2
)
U
n
em
p
lo
y
m
en
t
2
0
1
4
0
.0
3
-
0
.0
0
0
.0
7
*
*
*
0
.0
9
*
*
-
0
.0
0
0
.0
3
(0
.0
3
)
(0
.0
1
)
(0
.0
2
)
(0
.0
3
)
(0
.0
2
)
(0
.0
2
)
R
el
at
iv
e
d
ep
ri
v
at
io
n
9
u
n
em
p
lo
y
m
en
t
2
0
1
4
L
o
w
ed
u
ca
ti
o
n
9
u
n
em
p
lo
y
m
en
t
2
0
1
4
0
.0
2
*
*
0
.0
1
-
0
.0
0
-
0
.0
2
0
.0
4
*
*
0
.0
0
(0
.0
1
)
(0
.0
1
)
(0
.0
1
)
(0
.0
1
)
(0
.0
1
)
(0
.0
2
)
Relative deprivation and inequalities in social and…
T
a
b
le
4
co
n
ti
n
u
ed
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
(1
0
)
(1
1
)
(1
2
)
V
o
ti
n
g
C
o
n
ta
ct
in
g
D
em
o
n
st
ra
ti
n
g
S
tr
ik
in
g
V
o
lu
n
te
er
in
g
p
ar
ty
V
o
lu
n
te
er
in
g
an
ti
-c
u
ts
C
o
n
st
an
t
-
1
.0
6
*
-
3
.4
9
*
*
*
-
2
.3
7
*
*
*
-
3
.2
4
*
*
*
-
5
.6
9
*
*
*
-
5
.8
0
*
*
*
(0
.5
0
)
(0
.2
4
)
(0
.2
8
)
(0
.4
7
)
(0
.4
0
)
(0
.5
3
)
N
1
7
,6
6
7
1
7
,6
6
7
1
7
,6
6
7
1
7
,6
6
7
1
7
,6
6
7
1
7
,6
6
7
L
o
g
li
k
.
-
7
3
6
7
.5
0
-
6
1
4
9
.9
7
-
5
1
1
6
.5
2
-
3
1
8
1
.7
2
-
2
4
0
8
.3
6
-
8
5
6
.3
5
A
IC
1
4
,7
6
6
.9
9
1
2
,3
3
1
.9
4
1
0
,2
6
5
.0
4
6
3
9
5
.4
4
4
8
4
8
.7
2
1
7
4
4
.7
0
B
IC
1
4
,8
9
1
.4
6
1
2
,4
5
6
.4
1
1
0
,3
8
9
.5
1
6
5
1
9
.9
2
4
9
7
3
.1
9
1
8
6
9
.1
7
ru
0
.7
9
0
.3
2
0
.3
8
0
.6
9
0
.5
0
0
.5
2
q
0
.1
6
0
.0
3
0
.0
4
0
.1
3
0
.0
7
0
.0
8
S
ta
n
d
ar
d
er
ro
rs
in
p
ar
en
th
es
es
?
p
\
0
.1
0
,
*
p
\
0
.0
5
,
*
*
p
\
0
.0
1
,
*
*
*
p
\
0
.0
0
1
M. T. Grasso et al.
Next, we turn to analysing the evidence for H7 and H8 on the cross-level
interaction between a negative economic context and feelings of relative deprivation
presented in Models 1–6 of Table 4. Here, we find no evidence supporting H7 on
negative economic context emphasising the negative effect of relative deprivation
for depressing conventional activism, whereas there is evidence in support of H8 for
demonstrating: the positive effect of feelings of relative deprivation is further
increased in negative economic contexts. In other words, in more negative economic
contexts, the gap between those who felt deterioration in their living standards and
those that did not increases. This result supporting H8 is visually illustrated in
Fig. 1. Model 3 from Table 4 with one cross-level interaction for relative
deprivation and unemployment showed that the coefficient for relative deprivation
is - 0.10 and not significant, which means that there is no difference between those
who are relatively more or less deprived when the unemployment rate is 0. The
positive and statistically significant coefficient for the interaction term between
relative deprivation and unemployment (0.02) suggests that the gap between those
who are relatively more or less deprived increases as unemployment goes up. For
every percentage point increase in the unemployment rate, the gap in the log-odds of
protesting increases by 0.02. At what point do the relatively deprived start protesting
at higher levels than those who do not feel deprived? These estimates suggest that
the two groups start departing when unemployment reaches a level of 5% (i.e.
- 0.10/0.02 = - 5), that is, quite low.
Finally, we turn to examining the evidence for H9 presented in Models 7–12 of
Table 4 (lower education) and in Table 5 Models 1–6 (manual workers) and Models
7–12 (unemployed). Examining first the impact of a negative economic context on
the participation of individuals with a lower education, we find that against H9,
rather than further increasing the gap between more resource-poor and more
.0
5
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5
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Fig. 1 Demonstrating. Plot of the cross-level interaction between relative deprivation and
unemployment (adjusted predictions Model 3, Table 4)
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resource-rich groups with respect to education, a negative economic context
actually closes the participatory gap. In other words, while individuals with a lower
education are less likely than individuals with a higher education to vote, this gap
closes in contexts that are more negative. This signals that particularly negative
economic conditions actually have a mobilising effect for individuals in more
vulnerable social positions, making them more likely to attend the polling booth.
This is illustrated graphically in Fig. 2. Model 7 from Table 4 for voting shows that
the coefficient for low education is - 0.45 and significant, which means that those
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Fig. 2 Voting. Plot of the cross-level interaction between low education and unemployment (adjusted
predictions Model 7, Table 4)
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Fig. 3 Voting. Plot of the cross-level interaction between unemployed employment status and
unemployment (adjusted predictions Model 7, Table 3)
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with lower education are less likely to vote when the unemployment rate is 0. The
positive and statistically significant coefficient for the interaction term between low
education and unemployment (0.02) suggests that the gap between those who are
relatively more or less educated decreases as unemployment goes up. For every
percentage point increase in the unemployment rate, the gap in the log-odds of
voting decreases by 0.02. At what point do individuals with lower education start
voting at the same levels as those with higher education? These estimates suggest
that the two groups converge when unemployment reaches a level of 22.5% (i.e.
- 0.45/0.02 = - 22.5).
The same pattern is found when looking at the unemployed group (Model 7
Table 5) as illustrated in Fig. 3. Model 7 from Table 5 for voting shows that the
coefficient for unemployed is - 0.48 and significant, which means that the
unemployed are less likely to vote when the unemployment rate is 0. The positive
and statistically significant coefficient for the interaction term between manual
occupation and unemployment (0.02) suggests that the two groups converge when
unemployment reaches a level of 24% (i.e. - 0.48/0.02 = 24). As such, once again
these results show that particularly negative macro-economic contexts can act to
mobilise resource-poor groups, in this case, spurring the unemployed to vote. While
unemployed people are less likely to vote in better economic contexts, the gap
closes in particularly negative economic contexts so that these have a mobilising
effect for this group when it comes to voting. Moreover, a similar pattern occurs for
another conventional activity, volunteering for a party for both the low education
(Model 11 Table 4), and manual workers (Model 5 Table 5) groups. While
individuals with lower education are less likely to volunteer with a party in more
positive economic contexts, this gap reverses and they become more likely to
become involved with parties in particularly negative economic contexts. This is
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Fig. 4 Volunteering for a party. Plot of the cross-level interaction between low education and
unemployment (adjusted predictions Model 11, Table 4)
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illustrated in Fig. 4. Here, we can see that Model 11 from Table 4 shows that the
coefficient for low education is - 0.47 and significant, which means that those with
lower education are less likely to volunteer with a party when the unemployment
rate is 0. The positive and statistically significant coefficient for the interaction term
between low education and unemployment (0.04) suggests that those who are
relatively less educated become more mobilised relative to those who are more
educated as unemployment goes up. At what point do individuals with lower
education start volunteering at the same levels as those with higher education?
These estimates suggest that the two groups converge when unemployment reaches
a level of 11.75% (i.e. - 0.47/0.04 = - 11.75).
The same pattern for volunteering with a party occurs for manual workers (Model
5 Table 5). While individuals in manual occupations are less likely to volunteer
with a party when the economic context is better, this gap reverses and they become
more likely to become involved with parties in particularly negative economic
contexts. This is illustrated in Fig. 5. Model 5 from Table 5 for volunteering for a
party shows that the coefficient for manual occupation is - 0.49 and significant,
which means that those with a manual occupation are less likely to volunteer when
the unemployment rate is 0. The positive and statistically significant coefficient for
the interaction term between manual occupation and unemployment (0.03) suggests
that the two groups converge when unemployment reaches a level of 16.33% (i.e.
- 0.49/0.03 = - 16.33).
As such, we find evidence going in the opposite direction of H9: a negative
economic context closes or reverses—rather than further widening as we had
expected—the gap in conventional participation (both voting and volunteering in
political parties) between resource-poor and more resource-rich groups. This
suggests that particularly negative economic contexts have the potential to mobilise
those groups that tend to be less politically active. One could theorise that in
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Fig. 5 Volunteering for a party. Plot of the cross-level interaction between manual occupation and
unemployment (adjusted predictions Model 5, Table 5)
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particularly negative contexts individuals that normally do not participate come to
perceive participation as more important, as a more necessary action in the face of
threats or the potential loss of opportunities once afforded. For example, high
unemployment might draw people to punish the incumbents or vote for protest
parties and to become involved with parties proposing solutions to the current
problems.
Finally, we turn to examining the evidence for H10 presented in Models 7–12 of
Table 4 (lower education) and in Table 5 Models 1–6 (manual workers) and Models
.0
01
.0
02
.0
03
.0
04
.0
05
P
re
di
ct
ed
 M
ea
n,
 F
ix
ed
 P
or
tio
n 
O
nl
y
4.5 7 9.5 12 14.5 17 19.5 22 24.5
unemployment
Manual Occupation=0 Manual Occupation=1
Adjusted Predictions
Fig. 6 Volunteering for anti-cuts organisation. Plot of the cross-level interaction between manual
occupation and unemployment (adjusted predictions Model 6, Table 5)
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Fig. 7 Striking. Plot of the cross-level interaction between manual occupation and unemployment
(adjusted predictions Model 4, Table 5)
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7–12 (unemployed). Here, we find that the pattern for manual workers volunteering
for an anti-cuts organisation (Model 6 Table 5) is very similar once more to that
found for conventional participation. While individuals in manual occupations are
less likely to participate in more positive economic contexts, a negative economic
context reverses this pattern, mobilising individuals in manual occupations. This is
illustrated in Fig. 6. Model 6 from Table 5 for volunteering for an anti-cuts
organisation shows that the coefficient for manual occupation is - 0.96 and
significant, which means that those with a manual occupation are less likely to
volunteer when the unemployment rate is 0. The positive and statistically significant
coefficient for the interaction term between manual occupation and unemployment
(0.05) suggests that the two groups converge when unemployment reaches a level of
19.2% (i.e. - 0.96/0.05 = - 19.2).
On the other hand, striking shows a different pattern: individuals in manual
occupations are more likely to strike in less negative economic contexts but this gap
reverses in more negative economic contexts (Model 4 Table 5). This is illustrated
in Fig. 7. Model 4 from Table 5 for striking shows that the coefficient for manual
occupation is 0.44 and significant, which means that those with a manual occupation
are more likely to strike when the unemployment rate is 0. The negative and
statistically significant coefficient for the interaction term between manual
occupation and unemployment (- 0.03) suggests that the two groups converge
when unemployment reaches a level of 14.67% (i.e. 0.44/- 0.03 = - 14.67).
Perhaps this is since when economic conditions are particularly bad, individuals in
manual occupations feel that it is riskier to strike since there is a larger ‘reserve
army’ that could be brought into do their jobs. Therefore, while we found that
individuals who felt they were more deprived were even more likely to protest in
negative economic contexts, we found that individuals in manual occupations were
less likely to strike when the macro-level context was more deteriorated. We
interpret this result in light of the divergent cost–benefit analysis that individuals
face with respect to the different types of activities and the implications of a
deteriorated macro-level context. Whereas for protest this might signal a wider
politicisation of feelings of relative deprivation and thus more general societal
support, for striking this might signal that it is less likely that results will be obtained
since other people in potentially more deprived situations could be shipped in.
Taken together, our results show that both feelings of relative deprivation and a
negative economic context tend to stimulate unconventional activism. A lack of
resources on the other hand had demobilising impact on most types of activism, and
more so the conventional types. Overall, we found no support for H1 that relative
deprivation depresses conventional participation; we found support for H2 with
respect to the positive effect of relative deprivation on unconventional activism:
demonstrating, striking and volunteering for anti-cuts organisation. We found mixed
support H3 that resource-poor groups are less likely to engage in some forms of
conventional activism, but found little evidence for H4 that being in resource-poor
groups stimulates unconventional activism. As for H5 we did not find evidence that
a negative economic context depresses conventional activism, but there was support
for H6 for unconventional activism: demonstrating and striking are higher in more
negative economic contexts.
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In terms of the conditional hypotheses with relative deprivation and economic
context, we found no evidence for H7 for conventional participation but did find
evidence for H8 with respect to unconventional activism for protest alone. Finally,
with respect to the conditional hypotheses H9–H10, we found evidence that a
negative economic context generally has the effect of enhancing conventional
participation (and also volunteering in anti-cuts organisations, an unconventional
activity) rather than demobilising the participation of more resource-poor groups.
On the other hand, we found that a negative economic context interacted with being
in a manual occupation to inhibit strike activity at higher levels of unemployment.
Conclusion
This paper adds to the growing literature on the effects of deprivation and economic
crisis for various aspects of political life (English et al. 2016; Temple et al. 2016;
Temple and Grasso 2017). More specifically, the current investigation has shown
that feelings of relative deprivation and resources have divergent effects on
conventional and unconventional participation. While feelings of relative depriva-
tion tend to stimulate participation, particularly of the unconventional type, being
more resource poor has the effect of depressing participation, and more so for
conventional activism (Grasso 2011). Moreover, the current paper showed that
negative economic contexts tend to spur unconventional participation but not
conventional activism. Additionally, the effects of feelings of deprivation for protest
activism were found to be amplified in negative economic contexts. On the other
hand, negative economic contexts were found to close or reverse the gap between
individuals in resource-poor groups and those in more resource-rich groups with
respect to conventional activism—but also volunteering in anti-cuts organisations.
Thus, we have shown that while individual level feelings of relative deprivation
have mobilising effects for protest, this effect is amplified in wider negative
economic contexts (see also Grasso and Giugni 2016). We also found that negative
economic contexts can act to mobilise more resource-poor groups, such as those
with lower education, in manual occupations or the unemployed, leading them to
participate at higher rates than more resource-rich individuals when economic
conditions are particularly bad. We showed that in particularly negative economic
contexts individuals with lower resources (lower education, unemployed) closed the
voting gap with more resource-rich sections of the population, as well as the gap in
volunteering with parties (lower education, manual occupations) and in volunteer-
ing with anti-cuts organisations (manual occupations). On the other hand, we found
that more negative macro-economic contexts actually had a demobilising effect on
individuals in manual occupations with respect to striking which we interpreted in
terms of the higher risks that individuals in more vulnerable labour market positions
might attach to this type of political action in more turbulent economic times.
The recent economic crisis can be understood to have exacerbated feelings of
deprivation and inequalities and therefore to have either spurred or depressed the
political involvement of more deprived groups (Giugni and Grasso 2015a, 2017;
Grasso and Giugni 2013). In this paper, we utilised an original survey dataset
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collected in the context of a European project in 2015 (N = 17,667) and showed
that while being resource-poor has a negative effect on different aspects of
participation, feelings of relative deprivation can act as catalysts, particularly for
unconventional participation. Testing for cross-level interactions, we showed that
negative economic contexts can have a mobilising effect, closing or reversing the
gap between resource-poor and resource-rich groups with respect to certain types of
political action while also increasing the impact of feelings of relative deprivation
for protest participation. As such, this research underlies the importance of studying
the interaction between both subjective feelings of deprivation and inequalities with
macro-level contexts for understanding the dynamics of political participation in
advanced democracies. We urge further studies to apply micro–macro interactive
analyses in the future to continue to develop new insights in this important research
area for democratic societies.
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